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This paper provides a theoretical model on the trade-offs a MNE faces when assigning subsidiaries an 
active  role  in  innovation  and  organizing  its  R&D  decentralized  versus  centralized.  R&D 
decentralization avoids having to adapt centrally developed innovations to local markets, being able to 
use the specific know-how of the subsidiary.  In addition  R&D subsidiaries can be used  to  source 
locally available external know-how.  But the MNE has  to  organize the  transfer of local know-how 
internally so as to be able to benefit from this location specific know-how throughout the organization. 
At  the  same  time,  decentralization  of R&D  to  the  subsidiary  level  intensifies  the  challenge  of 
effectively appropriating core technology know-how, preventing the  spilling over of valuable know-
how to competitors, located in the foreign markets.  While R&D decentralization has repercussions on 
both intra-company technology transfers as well as inter company technology spillovers, it emerges as 
a possible equilibrium outcome from the resulting strategic interaction between the foreign subsidiary 
and  local  competition.  The proposed model  treats both internal and external  spillovers in  a game-
theoretic context explicitly recognizing that absorptive capacity is  required to  be able to  use  external 
spillovers.  The analysis suggests that a strong local know-how base is not a univocally positive factor 
for  locating  R&D abroad  and  indicates  the  critical  complementary  role  of managing  internal  and 
external spillovers to  capitalize on  the  benefits from  R&D  decentralization.  It also  shows  that the 
intensity of product market competition in the host country is important, especially in determining the 
outgoing spillover costs. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the traditional literature on multinationals, following the seminal work of Dunning 
(1988), multinational activities originate out of the R&D activities of the firm. But rather than 
seeing the geographic dispersion of MNEs as a result of knowledge creation, the emphasis in 
the literature has shifted towards seeing the geographic dispersion of MNEs as  a source for 
knowledge  creation  (see  a.o.  Cantwell  (1995),  Niosi  (1999),  Kuemrnerle  (1997)).  In the 
current  international  environment  innovation  strategies  require  increasingly  more  global 
sourcing, sensing new market and technology trends worldwide.  All  this  implies a different 
role for  subsidiaries in  the innovative strategy of the  multinational enterprise,  who  become 
important to access (local) external sources. The subsidiary is  being viewed as  a vehicle to 
continually reassess and upgrade know-how on core products and technologies, to provide a 
basis  for  new  generations  of  innovative  products,  which  can  be  used  throughout  the 
multinational  organisation  A  major  challenge  identified  for  the  MNE  is  to  find  an 
organisational system that  is  capable  of transferring know-how  across  units  and  locations, 
allowing locally generated know-how to be used globally. 
This  paper  provides  a  theoretical  model  on  the  trade-offs  a  MNE  faces  when 
assigning  subsidiaries  an  active  role  in  innovation  and  organising  its  R&D  decentralized 
versus centralized.  The model considers R&D decentralization as  a choice which allows to 
use the  specific know-how of the subsidiary and avoids having to  adapt centrally developed 
innovations to local markets.  In  addition R&D  subsidiaries can  be used  to  source  locally 
available external know-how.  But the MNE has to  organize the transfer of local know-how 
internally  so  as  to  be able to  benefit from this  location  specific know-how  throughout the 
organisation.  At the same time,  decentralization of R&D to  the subsidiary level intensifies 
the challenge of effectively appropriating core technology know-how, preventing the spilling 
over of valuable  know-how  to  competitors,  located  in  the  foreign  markets.  While R&D 
decentralization  has  repercussions  on  both  intra-company  as  well  as  inter  company 
technology transfers, it emerges as a possible equilibrium outcome from the resulting strategic 
interaction  between  the  foreign  subsidiary  and  local  competition.  The  proposed  model 
focuses  on  how  the  interplay  of internal  and  external  knowledge  flows  interacts  with  the 
nature of host market competition to  influence the choice of MNEs  to  effectively  disperse 
internationally its  R&D.  It treats both internal  and  external  spillovers  in  a game-theoretic 
2 context explictly recognizing that absorptive capacity  is  required to  be able  to  use external 
spillovers. 
Abstracting from  internal  technology  transfers,  the  impact  of external  know-how 
spillovers  on  the  incentives  of firms  to  innovate  has  been  widely  studied  in  Industrial 
Organization  (see  De  Bondt  (1996)  for  an  overview).  This  literature  focuses  on  the 
importance of the strategic effects of spillovers, stressing the interaction with product market 
competition.  High  spillovers  can  thus  lead to  underinvestment  in  R&D,  when firms  are 
marketing substitute products. Recently, some LO. models have taken into account that firms 
can manage these spillovers through organizational decisions. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
pioneered  the  idea  that  firms  can  try  to  increase  incoming  spillovers  by  investing  in 
"absorptive capacity", i.e. spillovers are more efficient in reducing own costs when the firm 
is engaged in own R&D.  This notion of absorptive capacity has  been integrated in the LO. 
models on R&D cooperation by  Kamien & Zang (2000).  The influence of external R&D 
spillovers  on  the  incentive  to  engage  in  FDI  has  also  been  analyzed  (Petit  &  Sanna-
Randaccio (2000». 
Another  related  line  of  research  is  the  geographical  localisation  of  innovative 
activities.  Innovative activities are found to be highly clustered (Jaffe et al  (1993), Audretsch 
&  Feldman  (1996».  The  principle  explanatory  factor  for  clustering  revolves  around  the 
existence of knowledge spillovers.  Since distance hinders the exchange of especially tacit 
knowledge,  proximity  matters  for  being  able  to  absorb  external  spillovers.  Hence  firms 
agglomerate their R&D activities  to  be able to capitalize on  external knowledge spillovers. 
Gersbach & Schmutzler (1999) present a game-theoretic model  of geographic clustering of 
activities.  A duopoly decides on the location of their R&D and production, while competing 
in final output markets a  la Bertrand.  An agglomeration equilibrium where both firms would 
choose their R&D site in  the  same location,  requires  simultaneously internal  and external 
spillovers:  not only must firms learn something from each other in agglomeration, they must 
also be able to transport this know-how internally. J 
A  more  closely  related  line  of previous  research,  linking  internal  and  external 
knowledge flows  and subsidiaries  of MNEs, can  be found  in  Das (1987),  who  examines 
whether parent firms  will  transfer technology to  subsidiaries  given  that  local  rivals  may 
learn.  This model is specifically set up for developing countries: the subsidiary is non R&D 
active,  but receives  a transfer of technology from  its  parents,  while  it  is  competing as  a 
J Gersbach & Schmutzler (1999) consider two types of external spillovers: external spillovers when rival 
production units are co-localized with own R&D sites, and knowledge complementarities among co-
localized R&D sites.  In addition, the firms also need to consider that internal spillovers are required when 
R&D is located separately from production.  When interpreting their results in an FDI setting (see 
Gersbach & Schmutzler (2000», their restriction to the use of only one R&D site per firm precludes a 
3 leading firm facing a competitive fringe of local firms  which are  non R&D active but can 
costIessly learn from subsidiaries.  The paper finds that despite learning by local firms, it is 
still worthwhile for the parent to transfer the better technology.  A similar LDC setting is 
used  in  Wang  &  Blomstrom  (1992)  who  take  into  account  that  MNEs  face  a  cost  of 
transferring internally technology, which will be higher for state-of-the-art technologies, and 
that locals face a cost of learning.  When the subsidiary competes in a differentiated duopoly 
with the local firm who faces a technology gap, they find that technology transfers via FDI 
are positively related to the level of host country's firms learning investment.  The focus of 
this  literature  on  LDCs  implies  that  only  the  internal  transfers  from  headquarters  to 
subsidiaries and the external transfers from subsidiaries to local firms are considered, while 
the competitive strncture the subsidiary is facing is one of a weaker local rival.  The issue of 
R&D decentralization is not at stake here. 
With the majority of FDI located in developed countries, subsidiaries active in R&D 
activities and technology sourcing becomes an  important issue resulting in flows from local 
external  sources to  subsidiaries,  while the  MNE has  to  ensure  that the  locally  generated 
know-how  flows  from  the  subsidiary  towards  the central  level.  In  addition the  issue of 
appropriating  know-how  becomes  more  critical  when  local  rivals  are  no  technology 
laggards.  Our analysis  of R&D  decentralization  by  the  MNE  focuses  on  the  interaction 
between host product market competition and both inter- and intra-firm know-how transfers. 
We consider both the  two-way  internal  transfer of know-how  between  headquarters  and 
subsidiaries as well as the two-way external transfer of know-how between subsidiaries and 
local competitors. 
Before presenting the model set-up and results, the paper starts with an overview of 
recent literature and stylized evidence on  internationalization of R&D,  which is used when 
constructing the model. 
2. Evidence on R&D decentralization by MNEs 
Centrifugal demand and supply related forces for decentralization need to be traded 
against centripetal forces  (see Grandstrand et al (1992)).  A decentralized R&D allows for 
responsiveness  to  local  differences.  These  are  the  demand  oriented  motives  for 
decentralization of R&D, where it is important to be close to "lead users" and adapt products 
and processes to local conditions, often related to host market regulations.  Supply oriented 
motives for R&D decentralization relate to acquiring access to a wider range of scientific and 
technological skills when technology sourcing (Kogut and Chang (1991)). A centralized R&D 
function allows to capitalize on economies of scale when pooling R&D resources.  The result 
treatment of the issue of decentralizing R&D to the subsidiary level with consequent internal know-how 
4 is internal transfers of know-how from central R&D labs to subsidiaries (Teece (1976)).  In 
addition centralization allows to  better control  R&D, minimizing leaking of information to 
(potential) competitors. 
Statistical evidence and survey results on R&D internationalization suggest that most 
research  still  remains  at  corporate  headquarters  (e.g.  Patel  &  Pavitt  (1992)).  But  the 
percentage of R&D carried out abroad is increasing rapidly (Grandstrand et al  (1992), Caves 
(1996), Serapio & Dalton (1999), Reger (2001)). 
If technology sourcing is an  (increasingly more) important motive for decentralizing 
R&D  this  should  be  reflected  in  technology  transfers  from  local  sources  to  foreign 
subsidiaries.  Most  of  the  empirical  literature  on  technology  spillovers  uses  patent 
information to trace know-how flows.  Almeida (1996) using US patent citations counts on a 
sample of foreign subsidiaries in the US semiconductor industry, finds foreign subsidiaries to 
cite regionally located firms significantly more.  Frost (1998) finds  proximity matters since 
foreign  subsidiaries cited other entities  located  in  the  same  state  more  frequently.  Also 
Branstetter (2000) found Japanese firms  investing in  the US  to  have a significantly higher 
probability of citing other US firms' patents. 
But foreign subsidiaries not only  acquire local know-how,  they  are also sources of 
knowledge spillovers to the local economy.  The empirical evidence on spillover benefits to 
the  local  economy  from  FDI  at the  aggregate  level,  have  generally  failed  to  find  robust 
evidence of positive knowledge spillovers from multinational investment (see Blomstrom & 
Kokko (1998), Mohnen (2001) for a review).  Turning to firm  level evidence for spillovers 
from foreign subsidiaries to the local economy, Almeida (1996) finds that patents belonging 
to foreign firms investing in the US are cited more by local US firms than other foreign firms. 
Also Branstetter (2000) finds  a higher probability of US  firms  citing Japanese firms  when 
they invest in the US. 
The choice between centralizing and decentralizing R&D also has implications on the 
internal know-how flows between parents and  subsidiaries.  While for centrally developed 
innovations, know-how flows from parents to subsidiaries, when subsidiaries are assigned a 
role in accessing and developing local specific know-how, this  know-how needs to flow  to 
corporate level.  Recent studies can more easily provide evidence for the transfers of know-
how from parents to affiliates, but find less conclusive support for the reverse direction, from 
subsidiaries to headquarters. Frost (1998), using USPTO data for 1980-1990, found evidence 
for the importance of headquarter patents for the innovations of subsidiaries, while patent data 
provided  only  limited  evidence  for  the  transfer  of  know-how  from  subsidiaries  to 
headquarters. 
transfers. 
5 Typically most empirical studies who trace know-how flows rely on patent citations. 
But a vast amount of information is transferred without writing it down in patent application 
or even  in  formal  contracts,  certainly  in  case  of internal  transfers.  Using  survey  based 
evidence to  directly assess the  occurrence of internal  technology transfers between parents 
and subsidiaries as  well as between subsidiaries and other external local partners, Mansfield 
&  Romeo  (1980»  found  that  two  third  of UK  firms  indicated  that  their  technological 
capabilities were raised by technology transfers from US  firms to their overseas subsidiaries. 
But only 20% felt this effect was of importance. Veugelers & Cassiman (2002) using survey 
data  from  a  sample  of  Belgian  innovation  active  manufacturing  firms  similarly  found 
evidence for not only technology transfers from parents to subsidiaries and from subsidiary to 
external local partners, but also for the reciprocal flows of know-how. 
3. The Model Set-up 
The empirical evidence  seems  to  suggest that the internationalization of R&D  and 
subsidiaries as  technology sources have become an  important trend. The model follows the 
empirical evidence on MNE innovative strategies, with subsidiaries located in countries with 
an own local know-how base and reciprocal intra- and inter-firm knowledge transfers.  We 
consider two  countries (country  I and 11).  Country I is  the  home base of a MNE (firm  1) 
which is a monopolist in the home market and controls a production subsidiary in country IT, 
where also a local producer (firm 2)  operates.  The MNE has  to  decide  whether or not to 
decentralize its R&D activities to the subsidiary. 
Both internal and external flows depend on whether the MNE decides to decentralize 
or not.  When  the MNE's foreign  production plant  is  active  in  R&D,  it faces  reciprocal 
external know-how flows with the local competition, i.e. the decentralized R&D unit will be 
able to absorb know-how from the local market.  But at the same time the local competition 
can absorb know-how from the decentralized R&D unit.  As  Figure 1 illustrates, in  case of 
centralization there are no external flows, i.e.  there is no spilling over of MNE know-how to 
local firms, but likewise no know-how can be sourced by the MNE.  With respect to internal 
flows, these remain unidirectional from parent to subsidiary in case of centralization, while 
decentralization implies a bi-directional internal flow. 
Insert Fig 1 here 
The decentralization decision of multinational R&D is studied in a two stage game. In 
the first stage firm 1 (the MNE) undertakes its R&D location choice taking into account how 
this decision affects its own and its rival output decision.  In  the second stage the subsidiary 
and  the  local  producer -competing a la  Cournot-,  decide  simultaneously  how  much  to 
6 produce and selI in country II, while the parent chooses as a monopolist the output to be sold 
in country I. 
3.1. Own  R&D resources and intemal & extemal R&D spillovers 
Both  the  MNE and  the  local  firm  are engaged in  product  innovation.  Taking a  short run 
perspective, we assume that  the total amount of resources devoted to  R&D by each firm is 
fixed.  Thus  with  xm and  xl  we indicate the given level of own R&D resources respectively 
from the MNE and the local producer.  While the local firm  produces and innovates only in 
its home market, the MNE  must decide where or not to decentralize its R&D activities. 
At:  Ad  -
xm =Xm =Xm  (I) 
(2) 
where superscript c represents R&D centralization and d R&D decentralization. Note that not 
only  R&D  resources  are  fixed  for  each  firm,  but  also  that  the  total  R&D  resources  are 
assumed to be the same in case of centralization or decentralization. 
Although  the  MNE's  R&D  resources  are  fixed  at  the  corporate  level,  the  R&D 
resources  individually  available  to  the  parent  and  the  subsidiary  varies  according  to  the 
MNE's R&D location decision. The MNE can locate alI of its R&D resources  xm  in country 
I.  This is the case of centralization.  Alternatively,  it can locate a share a of its total R&D 
resources in country II assigning an innovative task to  the subsidiary,  which  is  the  case of 
R&D decentralization.  Thus the own R&D resources of the parent and the subsidiary in the 
case of R&D centralization are given by: 
x~ =xm 
x~' =0 
while in the case of R&D decentralization: 
x%  = (1-a)xm 





The total effective know-how, which each plant can use for product innovation, is not 
only  composed  of own  R&D  resources,  but  also  includes  R&D  resources  of other plants 
within the same firm or from other firms, at least to the extent that these resources spill over 
across firm and country boundaries.  As to internal knowledge transfer between subsidiary 
and  parent, the know-how generated by the MNE in each market is  transferred to the other 
unit. The parameter  f3IP  indicates the share of know-how produced by the parent which is 
transferred to the subsidiary. Reciprocally, the parameter  f3 1 .\.  indicates the share of know-
7 how produced by the subsidiary which is transferred to the parent (see Fig.  1).  These internal 
transfers are imperfect, not only because of the costs associated  with transferring know-how 
but also because of the need to adapt transferred know-how. We have 
13 1  ~  1  (Si) 
In  the  case  of  f3/p,  a  parameter  value  below  1 reflects  the  classic  cost  of adapting  the 
centrally developed knowledge in the home lab to host market conditions. These costs arise 
from the fact that the products and processes developed by the parent need to be modified to 
satisfy  requirements  in  the  host  country.  The  more  dissimilar  the  home  and  the  foreign 
market, the larger the need for adaptation, i.e. the smaller will be  f3  II'  • 
As  to external knowledge transfer between the MNE and the local competitor, we 
assume  that  there  is  knowledge  dissemination  only  if  there  is  R&D  proximity  (cf 
agglomeration literature).  This implies that only when the  MNE decides to  decentralize its 
R&D, there will be external spillovers with the local competition.  These spillovers are two-
way.  On the one hand will decentralization create the possibility to source local know-how. 
These are the incoming spillovers  f3 Xl.  On the other hand,  locating R&D  resources to the 
local market open up  these resources for  spillovers to  the  local  competitors.  These are the 
outgoing spillovers  13 Xs  . 
iff  a>O.  (Sii) 
The assumption of localized spillovers furthermore implies  that even if a > 0, there is  no 
involuntary  transmission  to  the  local  firm  of the  knowledge  generated  by  the  parent in 
country I,  that is  for  x~ = (1-a)xm •  Only the decentralized R&D resources are spillover-
prone.  This implies that the MNE can influence the flow  to external local producers through 
its decentralization decision. 
In  addition we  account for  the fact  that the extent to  which external spillovers are 
integrated in the own knowledge base depends on  the  absorption capacity of the receiver.  2 
The own R&D resources serve to develop the absorptive capacity of the firm. Thus we have 
that  the  external  spillovers  received  from  the  local  firm  by  the  subsidiary  is  given  by 
(13  Xl dim )x/.  This implies that the MNE can influence the importance of incoming external 
spillovers through  the  amount of R&D resources  which  are  decentralized.  Similarly,  the 
external spillovers received by the local firm is given by  (13 XSXt )dim. This implies that the 
stronger the  R&D  base of the  local  competitor,  the  more  important the  outgoing external 
2 Note that we only consider absorptive capacity for external spillovers, but ignore it for internal spillovers. 
8 spillover effects will be for the local firm.  We impose the restriction that  fJ  XI dim  ~  I  and 
fJ x'xi  ~  1. 
Given the  previous assumptions,  we  can  now  characterize the effective  know-how 
base for each company.  This effective know-how base,  being a combination of own R&D 
and of the know-how obtained through internal and external spillovers, represents the amount 
the firm would have had to invest in research in the absence of spillovers to  obtain the same 
research output.  The effective know-how bases of the multinational parent, of the subsidiary 
and of the local firm in case of R&D centralization are: 
x~ =xm 
X,~ =f3 IPx m 
In case of R&D decentralization, the effective know-how bases are : 
X d  (I  )- fJIs  - fJIs (fJ Xl  - )- ,,=  - a  Xm  +  axm +  mm  xl 
X~  = dim + f3Ip (l-a)xm + (f3 Xldim)Xl 
xf =Xl + (f3 Xsxl)dim 







We  now  turn  to  characterizing the  second  stage,  which  is  the  market  competition  stage. 
Linear demand  functions  are  considered in  both  markets,  which  are  perfectly  segmented. 
While the parent firm is a monopolist in its  home market, in the local market its subsidiary 
competes a  la Cournot with the local competitor. Since product innovation is examined, the 
position of the respective demand curve for each producer depends on its effective know how 




with k=c, d.  The parameter bi (bn) is inversely related to market size in country I (country II). 
The parameter  <p  captures  product differentiation.  The  higher  <p  the  less  differentiated the 
goods  produced by  the  subsidiary and  the local firm and thus  the more  intense  is  product 
market competition in country II. 
9 3.3. Firm profits 
The MNE profits are given by the sum of profits gained in the two markets. Thus in 
the case of R&D centralization: 
fIe  = n e  + n e 
m  p  s 
fIe  e  [ =n[ 











The  negative  _I.CaXm )2  term  in  the  MNE  profitability  in  case  of  R&D 
2 
decentralization (12d) is  introduced to capture the presence of economies of scale in  R&D, 
which according to the literature represent a major centripetal force. If  R&D is decentralized 
these economies of scale are not fully exploited, implying an increase in R&D expenditure for 
the same amount of resources devoted to R&D. 
4.  Main results 
4.1  Location factors influencing  where to establish a foreign R&D lab 
In this section we will characterise what drives the profitability of the MNE in  case of R&D 
decentralization.  Identifying  the  subsidiary  specific  profitability  drivers  in  case  of 
decentralization, will allow us to highlight which are the main location factors influencing the 
10 decision of the MNE to undertake R&D activities in a specific foreign market.  We focus the 
discussion on local market size or cost conditions and the  local  know-how base as  location 
factors. 
By solving for optimal  output  in  the case  of decentralization,  respectively for the 
parent in country I and the subsidiary and the local firm in country II,  we obtain: 
-d  M p  (1- ar~'m  13 Is ciXm  13 Is (13 Xl ciXm )"Xl 
q  = --+  + ---+ -'----"---"'-'-'-
P  2bl  2bl  2bl  2bl 
(17) 
M  2f3IP{I)- (2f3XI  - )- (7  f3XS-)- Ad  ,  -a  Xm  axm -cP  Xl  --cP  Xl  axm 
q.,  =  ~  +  2  +  2  +  2 
(4-cp  )bl/  (4-cp  )bl/  (4-cp  )bll  (4-cp  )bll 
(18) 
and  Ms =(2-cp)All -2c, +cp  c,  represent  the  initial  (no 
innovation)  demand-cost  margin.  When  discussing  plant  level  profits,  we  can  focus  our 
attention  on  these  equations  since  the  profitability  of each  unit  (parent,  subsidiary)  is 
increasing in its own equilibrium output 3. 
The main focus is the impact on subsidiary profitability.  Expression (18) shows that, 
as expected, the subsidiary output, and hence profitability, increases with host country market 
size  (captured  by  Ms  and  by  the  demand  slope  11b1/)'  This  represents  a  first  important 
location  factor.  The  second  term  represents  the  extent  to  which  central  R&D  resources 
(1-a)xm  can still be deployed by  the subsidiary, even in  case  of decentralization, but only 
imperfectly given imperfect internal transfers  f3 1 1'  :0; I.  The better able the subsidiary is  in 
directly  using the  central  R&D  resources,  the  higher the  subsidiary  profitability.  Hence, 
closer matched locations requiring less adaptation of central know-how are more interesting 
location sites, ceteris paribus. 
Less evident as location factor is the role of local know-how (xl) and incoming and 
outgoing external spillovers to  which  we  now turn. The interesting aspect brought about by 
expression (18) is  the  way in which these knowledge transfers  interact with product market 
competition. 
From a technology  sourcing perspective, the  size  of the local know-how base (Xl) 
serves  as  an  important location factor.  The model  shows  that the  local rival's own R&D 
(X,) affects  subsidiary profitability in  three ways,  two of which  are captured by  the third 
term in Eq.  (18).  The  first effect is  due  to  the incoming external  technological spillovers 
enjoyed by  the subsidiary when undertaking innovative activity in  loco «13 Xl ciXm )Xl ). This 
11 effect is positive.  But the extent to which  q.~  is increasing in  xl  due to this effect depends on 
the subsidiary absorption capacity, which depends on the own  R&D resources decentralized 
to the subsidiary. 
The second effect of local know-how  Xl on subsidiary profitability comes via product 
market competition and is negative.  A higher level of local producer R&D resources,  xl  will 
make the local competitor stronger in the product market which will  have a negative impact 
on the subsidiary output level.  This impact is  stronger the more intense the competition is in 
the product market between the two producers (i.e. the higher is q». 
Thirdly,  xl  increase the local firm ability to capture the outgoing external spillovers 
generated by the subsidiary.  This is captured by the last term in Eq. (18).  Via this route, the 
local know-how base has a negative impact on  q1 and hence on affiliate profitability.  A local 
firm  with a stronger R&D base will be  better able to  absorb know-how from the subsidiary 
thus becoming a stronger competitor.  This effect depends on product market competition (as 
shown by the fact that the outgoing external spillover  /3 xSxlciim  is  multiplied by  q».  For 
instance, if q> = 0,  /3 Xs  has no effect  on  q1  since in this case the subsidiary is not affected 
negatively if its know-how is disseminated to the local economy. 
The necessary and sufficient condition  for  q.~  to  be  increasing in  the local firm's 
R&D (Xt ) is thus : 
(2/3 Xl  - q>/3  Xs )dXm > q> .  (19) 
which  shows  that  the  probability  that  the  condition  holds,  increases  with  product 
differentiation (lower q»,  and with the difference in intensity between incoming and outgoing 
external  spillovers.  Hence  we  compare  the  net  effect  via  external  spillovers  with  the 
competition effect.  Eq.(19) is the condition that needs to hold for the R&D investment by the 
local firm (Xt ) to lead to an increase in the subsidiary profitability. 
The size of the local know-how  base  Xl affects also  the profitability of the parent 
company.  Expression (17)  allow us  to  discuss the  impact of  Xl  on  the parent plant when 
decentralizing R&D to the subsidiary.  The last term in  Eq. (17) shows that, in the case of 
decentralization,  the  parent  plant  profits  from  the  incoming  external  spillovers  when 
allocating R&D  resources  in  country  II.  In  fact  fi%  (and  thus  parent's profitability) is 
increasing in  x,  (the amount of R&D undertaken by the local producer) at least to the extent 
12 that  f3  Xl (external spillovers of know-how from the local producer to the subsidiary) exists. 
Furthermore,  since  the  absorption  capacity  of each  unit  is  firm-specific,  the  amount  of 
potential spillovers appropriated by the subsidiary and then passed to the parent is increasing 
in the subsidiary'S own R&D (aXm ). Hence the more R&D is decentralized to the subsidiary 
the  larger the  positive  effect  from  sourcing  local  spillovers  on  the  parent  plant  profits. 
However the benefits for the parent from the learning which is  associated to  locating R&D 
activities  abroad depends also  on  the MNE's ability  to  transfer this  knowledge  internally 
from the subsidiary to other units of the MNE  (i.e. on  f3ls).  Thus the internal and external 
transfer mechanisms interact in determining the final effect for the parent. 
The  last term in  Eq.  (18)  accounts  for  the  "own R&D  effect",  which  is  certainly 
positive since  f3  Xs Xl  ::; 1. This term shows that the subsidiary output and hence profitability is 
increasing in the amount of R&D undertaken in country II (aXl11  ), even when allowing for the 
fact that part of this knowledge may leak to the local firm.  As discussed supra, the size of the 
outgoing external  spillover is  influenced by  the  absorption  capacity  of the  local firm,  i.e. 
f3 xSXI'  and the intensity of product market competition. 
The positive effect of own  R&D on  q.~  is  reinforced by  the fact that the subsidiary 
absorption capacity, and thus the amount of learning from the local producer, i.e. the external 
incoming spillover, depends on  aXm ,  as  shown  in  the  third  term in  Eq.  (18).  Hence own 
R&D resources in the subsidiary plant also serve to enhance the learning effect from the local 
economy. 
The necessary and  sufficient condition for  q~ to  be  increasing in  the subsidiary's 
own R&D (aXm ) is 
f3ls (f3 Xlxl + 1) > 1  (20) 
4.2  The MNE decision to decentralize its R&D activities 
4.2.1. Conditions for R&D decentralization 
The solution  of the first  stage game allows  to  identify under  which  condition the 
MNE will decide to decentralize its R&D activities, i.e. locate a share of its R&D activities in 
country II assigning a role in its overall research effort to the subsidiary operating there. 
The MNE  will choose decentralization iff: 
13 (21) 
Hence discussing the decentralization decision involves comparing both subsidiary and parent 
profitability in case of decentralization versus centralization. 
Let us recall that: 
(22) 
We consider first  the effect of R&D decentralization on  parent's and  subsidiary's variable 
profits separately, before analyzing the overall effect.  This way  of proceeding will allow us 
to  highlight how R&D decentralization affects the profitability of the different units  of the 
MNE.4 
From Eq. (22), since output levels are nonnegative,  qJ  ~  0  (with k=c,d and j=p,s,l), 
we have that: 
(23) 
(24) 
Thus the necessary and sufficient conditions for  (q~ -q~»O  and  (q.~ -q.~»O represent 
sufficient conditions for the MNE variable profits to increase when R&D is decentralized. 
4.2.2. The impact of R&D decentralization on the parent's plant  profits 
We first discuss the effect of  R&D decentralization on the parent plant's profitability. 
As to the effect of R&D decentralization on  the parent equilibrium output level (and thus on 
parent's profitability), we have that: 
.d.c  (l-f3Is)aXm  f3Isf3XlaXmXt 
q,,-q,,=- 2b  +  2b 
I  I 
(25) 
The first  term captures  the negative  impact  that  R&D  decentralization  has  on  the 
parent equilibrium output level. This effect arises from the  short run  nature of the problem 
examined. Being in the short run, the total amount of resources devoted to R&D by the MNE 
4 Disentangling parent and affiliate profits from the decentralization choice is interesting when considering 
the bargaining process internally within the MNE.  For instance if the decision to decentralize R&D will 
only be taken if at least each party benefits, this implies that  (if~ - if~;) >0 and  (if.~ - if.;')  >0 need to 
hold in addition to (21). 
14 is given and consequently the choice of allocating R&D abroad implies lower R&D resources 
at  home.  This  has  a  negative  repercussion  on  the  parent  equilibrium  output  and  hence 
profitability. This effect is at least partly compensated by the fact that the subsidiary transfers 
the know-how it creates back to the parent. This transfer is however imperfect with  I3i.1"  :::; 1 . 
The negative effect is  thus  mitigated  by  internal transfers  f3 ls , and  hence depends  on  the 
ability of the subsidiary to transfer know-how to the central level. Only in the extreme case of 
perfect internal transfers  f3ls  = 1 this negative term disappears. 
The second term of (25) captures the beneficial effect of R&D decentralization on the 
parent's output level from being able to gain access to the foreign pool of potential spillovers 
generated by local producers, cf supra.  The benefit for the parent however again depends on 
the value of f3ls.  Thus the ability of the subsidiary to transfer back knowledge to the parent 
acts  as  a  filter.  Whether  the  parent  benefits  from  the  incoming  external  spillovers  also 
depends  on  the  absorption  capacity  of the  subsidiary.  Since  the  subsidiary  absorption 
capacity depends on its own R&D (given by  dXm ), both the positive and the negative effects 
of R&D decentralization on parent's profitability are rising in the amount of R&D resources 
allocated to the subsidiary. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for  q~ - q~ > 0  and hence for parent profits 
to  be  larger  in  case  of  decentralization,  i.e.  if;~ - if~ > 0,  is  condition  (20): 
f3!'>' (13 Xl Xl + 1) > 1.  This condition  clearly indicates that  the  ability  of the subsidiary  to 
channel back know-how is  a crucial determinant of the effect of R&D decentralization on 
parent's profitability. It stresses the crucial role of internal knowledge management within the 
MNE.  The  condition  also  brings  to  attention  the  importance  of the  interaction  between 
internal  and  external  knowledge  transfer  mechanisms.  The  larger  the  incoming  external 
spillovers, the more likely that (20)  will hold.  Although the  sign of  (q~ - q~), does not 
depend  on  the  amount  of R&D  resources  decentralized,  the  magnitude  of the  positive 
(negative) effect is increasing in aXm  and the size of country 1. 
4.2.3. The impact of R&D decentralization on the subsidiary's  profits 
The effect of R&D decentralization on the subsidiary output (and thus the impact on 
subsidiary profitability) depends upon: 
(26) 
15 The  first  term  in  Eq.  (26)  is  connected  to  the  adaptation  motive  for  R&D 
decentralization, i.e.  with the demand related motives for  establishing a foreign R&D  lab. 
When the MNE allocates R&D resources to the host country (dim) instead of devoting them 
to  the  parent lab,  the foreign  lab's innovative effort is  tailored  to  satisfy  local needs  and 
benefits from proximity with local production. Thus the subsidiary can avoid the adaptation 
costs that it would have to incur if the MNE had chosen to centralize all R&D in the home 
country.  The lower f3 Ip ,  the  smaller the  share of the knowledge generated by the parent 
which is  of use in  the host country,  and thus  the  greater the  benefits  of localizing R&D 
where there is  production.  That is  why  the  benefits of undertaking  dim  R&D in  loco is 
weighted by  the  term  (1 - f3 Ip)  which  can  be  considered as  representing the unit cost of 
adapting to  local  conditions the  know-how  transferred  by  the  parent  to  the  subsidiary. If 
f3 Ip  =  1  the  first  term in  Eq.  (26)  vanishes,  showing that  in  the  extreme  case  of perfect 
internal knowledge transfer from  the  parent to  the  subsidiary  (and  thus  in the absence of 
adaptation costs) there is no incentive to decentralize R&D due to this motive. 
The  second  term  in  Eq.  (26)  reflects  the  supply  related  motives  for  R&D 
decentralization,  connected  with  the  learning  motive.  It  captures  the  effect  of incoming 
external spillovers which arise because of the proximity between the subsidiary lab and the 
local producer lab. By decentralizing R&D, the MNE becomes able to absorb from the local 
firm, benefiting from incoming external spillovers.  Eq. (26) shows that the positive effect of 
incoming external spillovers on the subsidiary profitability is not affected by product market 
competition, i.e. connected with  <p and thus does not work via product market competition. 
However there are also dangers associated to localizing R&D resources close to local 
competitors.  These costs are represented by the third term in Eq. (26) capturing the effect of 
the outgoing external spillovers. Due to lab proximity, at least part of the know-how created 
by the subsidiary will leak to the local producer.  The dissemination of the subsidiary's own 
R&D to the local firm has a negative impact on the subsidiary profitability since it increases 
the local firm competitiveness in the product market.  Thus the outgoing external spillovers 
sort their effect via product market competition. That is  why  the  intensity of the negative 
impact  of  the  outgoing  external  spillovers  depends  on  cp  (the  product  differentiation 
parameter).  The  higher  product  differentiation  and  thus  the  less  intense  product  market 
competition (the lower cp),  the lower the costs of R&D proximity.  The extent to which the 
local producer can benefit from these spillovers depends on  its absorptive capacity which in 
tum is determined by its own R&D resources XI'  Thus the stronger the know-how base of the 
local competitor, the larger the negative impact on subsidiary profits of the outgoing external 
spillovers. 
16 The necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  q.~ - q.~ > 0  (and  hence  for  subsidiary 
profits to be higher in case of R&D decentralization, i.e. for  it,~ - it.~ > 0) becomes: 
(27) 
from which we have 
(28) 
If the external spillover parameter is symmetric (13 Xl  = f3 x,), condition (28) always 
holds since <p  <2 and  f3lp  :51 . Thus if the intensity of external technological spillovers (i.e. 
13 x)  is  sector/technology  specific,  the  subsidiary  eqUilibrium  output  (and  profits)  will 
increase when R&D  is decentralized for any value of a,  13 1 1', and  <po  This is the case since 
the  positive  effect  of the  incoming  external  spillovers  is  direct,  with  incoming  external 
spillovers a pure externality, while the negative effect of the outgoing external spillovers is 
mediated  via  competition  in  the  product  market.  On  the  other  hand,  if  (f3 Xl  = f3 XS), 
condition (20) required for parent's profitability to rise, does not necessarily holdS. Thus the 
model suggests that R&D decentralization is more likely to result in  higher profitability for 
the subsidiary than for the parent unit. 
If the external spillover parameter is  asymmetric  (f3 XI  '*  f3 x"), we obtain from Eq. 
(28) that the sufficient condition for  q~ - q.~ > 0  (and for subsidiary profits to  be higher in 
case of R&D decentralization, i.e. for it: - it.~ > 0) becomes: 
(29) 
Note  that  condition  (29)  is  riot  overly  restrictive  and  allows  for  the  outgoing  spillover 
parameter to be larger than the incoming spillover parameter. 
Another special case is  when the local firms  are no direct competitors, for instance 
when  they  would be  research  institutes  or firms  with  related  technologies  but which  are 
unrelated in the product market.  If <p=O, the negative effect of the outgoing external spillovers 
vanishes. This means we would have in this case the subsidiary to profit from decentralization 
( it: - it; > 0 ) for all values of the other parameters. 
Overall, it is likely that the decision to assign an innovative role to the subsidiary will 
result in an increase of the latter profitability, which explains the subsidiaries' call on part of 
the R&D resources of the MNE. 
5 If f3  Xl  = f3  Xs  this implies that since f3 Xl Xl  :51 , condition (20) does not hold for  f3 J  ••  ~0.5. 
17 4.2.4. The impact on the MNE's total profits 
To assess  the overall  effect  on  the  MNE profitability  however requires  that due 
consideration should be given not only to the impact on the subsidiary profitability but also to 
the effects on parent profitability and to the role of the additional R&D costs due to foregone 
economies of scale.  In total, we have six effects that form  the benefits and the costs from 
R&D decentralization: 
•  (B.I) avoidance of adaptation of central innovations by the subsidiary (first term in (26» 
•  (B.2) benefits from the incoming external spillovers to the subsidiary (second term in (26» 
•  (B.3) benefits from the incoming external spillovers to the parent (second term in (25» 
•  (C.I) the foregone economies of scale in R&D (last term in (22» 
•  (C.2) the impact on the subsidiary from outgoing external spillovers (third term in (26» 
•  (C.3) the loss of R&D resources for the parent plant which are decentralized to the subsidiary but 
not fully recoverable due to imperfect internal transfers (first term in (25» 
In order to fully solve the first stage game (i.e. the R&D decentralization choice) we 
need to compare the total MNE's profits corresponding to each  of the two potential states 
(decentralization/centralization) (Eq. (22)). The complexity of the expressions for equilibrium 
profits  makes  it  difficult  to  perform  analytical  comparisons  to  fully  characterize  the 
equilibrium choices in general.  Nevertheless, we  can discuss  the factors driving costs and 
benefits of decentralization and  characterize the outcome for  some special cases.  Hence, 
rather than evaluating the conditions required for  fI~ - fI~, > 0, i.e. for decentralization of 
R&D to be the solution of the game, we will concentrate mostly on discussing factors that can 
promote R&D decentralization by analysing the sign of the partial derivative of exogeneous 
factors on the overall net profits from R&D decentralization. 
4.3  Factors  affecting  the  impact  of  R&D  decentralization  on  total  MNE's 
profits 
Of particular interest to  consider as  factors  influencing  the  R&D  decentralization 
decision by the MNE are the local know-how base and the mechanisms to transfer know-how 
internally and externally. 
4.3.1. Local know-how base 
18 A first  important factor  affecting  fI~, - fI~,  and  hence  the  R&D  decentralization 
decision, is the local know-how base  XI'  From supra we know that a strong local know-how 
base increases the benefits from incoming external spillovers both for the subsidiary and the 
parent (B.2 and B.3).  But at the same time it enlarges the cost of outgoing external spillovers 
(C.2) since the local rival will have a stronger absorptive capacity.  Already at the subsidiary 
level, the net effect of a local know-how base can  be positive (i.e. C.2 < B.2).  For this Eq. 
(19) was the necessary and sufficient condition, cf supra.  If  we consider the overall effect of 
the local know-how base on the incentives to decentralize, Eq.(19) is not only a necessary and 
sufficient  condition  to  increase  subsidiary  profitability,  cf  supra,  it  is  also  a  sufficient 
condition for the  local R&D base  XI  to  act as  a driver for  R&D  decentralization (Le.  for 
o(IId  _  IIc  ) 
m  m  >O),as shown in expression (31): 
ax[ 
Eq. (31) is not always positive, which would imply that a local know-how base is not 
a univocally positive factor for R&D decentralization  This would happen when the cost of 
outgoing external spillovers becomes very important. This cost would start to dominate when 
competition is strong, i.e. <p large, and the learning is asymmetric, i.e.  13 x,  is high, while  13 XI 
is low. 6 
4.3.2. Internal transfer of know-how 
Another  important  factor  determining  the  size  of  both  benefits  and  costs  to 
decentralization is  the process of internal transfer of know-how  within the MNE. We have 
that 
(32) 
Eq. (32) shows that the incentive to decentralize R&D is increasing in  13 1 ." • A better 
internal  transfer  of  know-how  from  subsidiary  to  parent  results  in  lower  costs  of 
decentralization (lower C.3) and in  larger benefits from  incoming external spillovers to the 
6  For instance. it can easily be checked that for the extreme case when (  13 x,' XI )=1.  13 XI =0. and <p>0. 
(31) will indeed be negative if 131 1' <0.5.  If f3lp is large. we require for (31) to be negative that qd, is large 
enough.  Eg f3lP  =1  requires qd, >  113. 
19 parent  (higher  B.3).  For  instance,  perfect  internal  transfers  from  the  subsidiary  to  the 
parent, 13 1., =1, will eliminate the parent plant's adaption cost (C.3). 
A better internal transfer from the parent to the subsidiary does not always discourage 
decentralization?  In  fact  f3ll'  has  an  ambigous  effect on  the  incentive to  invest abroad in 
R&D. We have that 
a  (fr~ - fr~,) 
af3 ll' 
from which 
.  a(rr~ -rr~,)  sign{(l-a);i.~ _q.~) 
sIgn  af3 lP  ~ 
(33) 
(34) 
which implies that, if the subsidiary's output in case of decentralization is large enough, 
a  more  efficient  internal  transfers  from  the  parent  may  actually  act  as  incentive  for  R&D 
decentralization 
4.3.3. External transfer of know-how 
Since both parent and subsidiary enjoy higher profits in case of decentralization when 
there are more spillovers from the local source (see (B.3) & (B.2», we have 
8  (fI~ -fr~) 
813 XI 
(35) 
This means that higher spillovers from the local source to the MNE univocally acts as 
an  incentivator  for  R&D  decentralization.  But  of course:  since  subsidiary  profits  will 
decrease with higher spillovers to the local source (see C.2), we have at the same time: 
Cl  (fr~ - fr~)  _ [2aXmx l r d  < 0 
Clf3xS  qJ  (4_qJ2) q.I  (36) 
Expression  (36)  implies  that being  able  to  prevent  spillovers  to  the  local  source 
univocally improves the case for R&D decentralization.  However since the negative role of 
13  X.,.  depends on  cp,  Eq.(36)  suggests that investing in knowledge  protection  measures for 
lowering  13 x.,  (such  as  employee conduct rules  or  measures  to  reduce  knowledge-worker 
exits) is especially important for firms facing close competitors in production. 
?  Perfect  internal  transfers  from  the  parent,  f3lP  =1,  eliminate  the  subsidiary's  adaption  motive  for 
decentralization (B.1), leaving only the incoming external spillovers as drivers for R&D decentralization. 
20 If the external spillover parameter is symmetric (f3 XI  = f3 x., ), the total effect will be 
positive since already at the subsidiary level B.2. > C.2, cf supra. 
4.3.4. Cross effects 
Given  the  importance  of  both  internal  and  external  knowledge  transfers,  it  is 
interesting to discuss cross effects.  It can easily be shown that 8: 
a2(TI~, - TI~,) > 0 
a/Flaw"' 
(37) 
Expression (37) implies that there is a complementarity between internal and external 
know-how transfers:  a better internal know-how transfer process within the MNE, increases 
the efficiency of mechanisms used to  acquire  external know-how  and  vice  versa.  In other 
words, the role of the spillovers generated by local innovators as a centrifugal factor to induce 
a MNE to locate R&D in that country rests also on the ability  of the MNE's subsidiary to 
transfer internally knowledge across geographic boundaries and vice versa. 
The cross effects with respect to  XI  similarly allow to discuss which complementary 
forces the MNE can use to maximize the positive impact from local know-how sourcing on 
overall MNE profitability.  It is quite easy to show that 
a\TId _TIt") 
m  m  >0. 
axlaf3I '.  , 
and when condition (19) holds 
a2(TId  _TIt") 
01  m  >0. 
axlaf3 xl  ' 
a2(TId  _TIt") 
m  01  <0. 




When the MNE locates R&D abroad, the MNE is much more likely to benefit from 
the technology  sourcing advantage from decentralization  when  it  has  an  efficient internal 
know-how transfer process (high  f31.v  ); when it has an efficient process to absorb externally 
available know-how (high  f3 XI);  and when it can prevent know-how from spilling over to 
competitors  all  to  easily  (low f3 x  .. ).  These  results  illustrate  again  the  complementarity 
between an efficient knowledge management system and the technology sourcing motive for 
R&D decentralization. 
A final important factor to consider as complementary force in technology sourcing is 
the amount of R&D resources allocated to the subsidiary dim' serving as absorption capacity 
21 for  external  know-how  acquisition,  but  at  the  same  time  opening  up  the  possibility  of 
appropriation by local competition. 
While condition (27) is sufficient for 
conditions (20) and (27) are sufficient for 
a 2(TId -TI") 
no  m  >0' 
af3 xlaaxno  ' 
a 2(TId -TI") 
m  m  >0; 




This  implies  that  having  more  R&D  resources  located  at  the  subsidiary  level 
increases the extent to which the MNE at the corporate level can benefit from local learning 
as  well  as  internal  know-how  transfers  from  the  subsidiary  when  decentralizing  R&D. 
Equivalently,  a higher external  spillover level  from  local  sources  (high  13 XI) and  a better 
ability to use subsidiary know-how at corporate level (high  f3ls  ) will push the MNE,  when 
deciding on the optimal amount of decentralizing R&D resources, to allocate more resources 
to the subsidiary level.  On the contrary, a high level of outgoing external spillovers, i.e. low 
level of appropriability, (high 13 x.,),  will lead the MNE to allocate less R&D resources to the 
subsidiary . 
Finally, condition (19) together with (20) and (27) are sufficient for 
a 2(TId  _TIC) 
m  m  >0' 
aXI a  axm  ' 
(44) 
Since conditions (19), (20) & (27) are more likely to hold with a high  13 XI and a low 
<p  and/or low 13 x."  this  implies  that  a sufficiently  large incoming external  spillover level 
while having weak competition or high enough appropriability of subsidiary know-how are 
sufficient conditions for the size of the local know-how base to act as a stimulus for allocating 
more R&D resources to the subsidiary level. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides a theoretical model on the trade-offs which a MNE faces  when 
assigning  subsidiaries  an  active  role  in  innovation  and  organizing  its  R&D  decentralized. 
R&D  decentralization  avoids  having  to  adapt  centrally  developed  innovations  to  local 
8 The full expression is not reported for sake of space. 
22 markets. In addition R&D subsidiaries can be used to source locally available external know-
how.  But the MNE has to organize the transfer of local know-how internally so as to be able 
to  benefit from this  location  specific  know-how  throughout the  organization.  At the  same 
time, decentralization of R&D to the subsidiary level opens up  the possible spilling over of 
valuable know-how to competitors located in the foreign markets. 
The  proposed  model  focuses  on  how  the  interplay  of  internal  and  external 
knowledge flows interacts with the nature of host market competition to influence the choice 
of MNEs to effectively disperse internationally its R&D. The intensity of competition in the 
local market emerges as important in determining the size of both benefits and costs to R&D 
decentralization. It is especially significant in determining the outgoing spillover costs. In the 
absence  of local  competitors  in  production,  the  subsidiary  will  always  profit from  R&D 
decentralization in our model. But even if there is  local competition to worry about, the cost 
from  outgoing external  spillovers  is  outweigh  ted  by  the  benefit  from  incoming  external 
spillovers at the subsidiary level, at least when external spillovers are symmetric. 
In addition, the model indicates that a strong local know-how base is not necessarily 
a motive for R&D decentralization. While it increases the benefits from incoming external 
spillovers both for  the  subsidiary  and  the  parent,  at the same  time  it enlarges the  cost of 
outgoing external  spillovers  since the local rival  will  have  a stronger absorptive capacity. 
This cost could start to  dominate when competition is strong and the external spillovers are 
asymmetric, sufficiently in disfavor of the MNE. 
We also find  that a more efficient internal know-how  transfer process  within  the 
MNE from the subsidiary to the parent univocally acts to promote R&D decentralization. It 
will increase the benefits from incoming external spillovers to  the parent. But on the other 
hand,  a more efficient transfer of know-how from  the parent to  the subsidiary makes the 
motive for avoiding adaptation by the subsidiary less prevailing.  Nevertheless it does not 
always discourage the  MNE from investing abroad in R&D.  A better internal know-how 
transfer process  within  the  multinational increases  the  efficiency  of mechanisms  used to 
source  external  know-how  and  vice  versa.  Hence,  the  results  clearly  illustrate  the 
complementarity between an  efficient internal and external knowledge management system 
and  the  technology  sourcing  motive  for  R&D  decentralization.  Another  important 
complementary force  increasing the efficiency of technology sourcing is  the decentralized 
know-how base, which serves to absorb local know-how. 
While the  model  allows  to  discuss  the  forces  driving  costs  and  benefits  of R&D 
decentralization  within  multinational  firms,  a  full  characterization  of the  decentralization 
choice  of the  multinational  requires  numerical  simulations,  given  the  complexity  of the 
setting.  Our future research will move towards obtaining predictions from the model which 
can be tested against data on  R&D decentralization.  Extending the model, such as to allow 
23 for  endogeneous  R&D  resources,  or  local  competitors  reciprocally  locating R&D  abroad, 







































Figure IB: Knowledge Transfers with Centralized R&D 
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